IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/nhhfms/2025_017.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Channel Coordination on Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Content under Endogenous Consumer Homing

Author

Listed:
  • Arve, Malin

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Dyskeland, Ole Kristian

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Foros, Øystein

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

We analyze competition between two digital platforms selling subscriptions for unlimited access to their content catalogs (e.g., streaming and TV broadcasting platforms). A content provider offers additional content to the platforms. The content provider chooses between offering a revenue sharing contract and a per-consumer wholesale pricing contract towards the platforms, thereby endogenously determining whether its content will be distributed non-exclusively (on both platforms) or exclusively (on one platform). Our model yields clear predictions: In markets with low initial exclusivity, the content provider and both platforms prefer per-consumer wholesale pricing to endogenously promote non-exclusive distribution. Platforms set subscription prices that lead to full consumer singlehoming. Conversely, in markets with high initial exclusivity, all market players prefer a revenue-sharing contract that induces exclusive distribution, with platforms setting prices that encourage some consumers to multihome.

Suggested Citation

  • Arve, Malin & Dyskeland, Ole Kristian & Foros, Øystein, 2025. "Channel Coordination on Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Content under Endogenous Consumer Homing," Discussion Papers 2025/17, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2025_017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3195905
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multihoming; incremental pricing; content provision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2025_017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stein Fossen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dfnhhno.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.