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Channel Coordination on Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Content under Endogenous Consumer Homing

Author

Listed:
  • Arve, Malin

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Dyskeland, Ole Kristian

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Foros, Øystein

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

We analyze competition between two digital platforms selling subscriptions for unlimited access to their content catalogs (e.g., streaming and TV broadcasting platforms). A content provider offers additional content to the platforms. The content provider chooses between offering a revenue sharing contract and a per-consumer wholesale pricing contract towards the platforms, thereby endogenously determining whether its content will be distributed non-exclusively (on both platforms) or exclusively (on one platform). Our model yields clear predictions: In markets with low initial exclusivity, the content provider and both platforms prefer per-consumer wholesale pricing to endogenously promote non-exclusive distribution. Platforms set subscription prices that lead to full consumer singlehoming. Conversely, in markets with high initial exclusivity, all market players prefer a revenue-sharing contract that induces exclusive distribution, with platforms setting prices that encourage some consumers to multihome.

Suggested Citation

  • Arve, Malin & Dyskeland, Ole Kristian & Foros, Øystein, 2025. "Channel Coordination on Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Content under Endogenous Consumer Homing," Discussion Papers 2025/17, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2025_017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hyunho Kim & Konstantinos Serfes, 2006. "A Location Model With Preference For Variety," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 569-595, December.
    2. Vibhanshu Abhishek & Kinshuk Jerath & Z. John Zhang, 2016. "Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(8), pages 2259-2280, August.
    3. Dyskeland, Ole Kristian & Foros, Øystein, 2023. "Multihoming and market expansion: Effects on media platforms’ pricing and content creation incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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