Fair tax evasion
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- Gabriela S. Pantoja & Rodrigo S. Penaloza, 2014. "Tax evasion under behavioral structures," Economia, ANPEC - AssociaÃ§Ã£o Nacional dos Centros de PÃ³s-GraduaÃ§Ã£o em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 15(1), pages 30-40.
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More about this item
KeywordsTax evasion; redistributive taxation; fair income distribution.;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IUE-2013-05-22 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-05-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2013-05-22 (Public Finance)
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