IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/iuiwop/0242.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Taxes and Mergers in Sweden

Author

Listed:
  • Modén, Karl-Markus

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

Abstract

This paper studies the relative importance of tax incentives as merger motives in the Swedish industry during the period 1983-1987. Several econometric models are estimated and statistical tests performed. The tax-hypothesis is contrasted with an alternative hypothesis, suggested by Jensen, which explains mergers as a way for independent managers to increase their personal power. Neither hypothesis get any strong support in this study, the evidence is somewhat stronger in favor of Jensen's theory however.

Suggested Citation

  • Modén, Karl-Markus, 1989. "Taxes and Mergers in Sweden," Working Paper Series 242, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0242
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp242.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Galai, Dan & Masulis, Ronald W., 1976. "The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 53-81.
    2. Auerbach, Alan J, 1983. "Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 905-940, September.
    3. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1, March.
    4. Alan J. Auerbach, 1986. "The Dynamic Effects of Tax Law Asymmetries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(2), pages 205-225.
    5. Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, 1988. "The Effects of Taxation on the Merger Decision," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 157-190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Lewellen, Wilbur G, 1971. "A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 26(2), pages 521-537, May.
    7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    8. Tobin, James, 1969. "A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 15-29, February.
    9. Auerbach, Alan J., 1983. "Stockholder tax rates and firm attributes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 107-127, July.
    10. Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, 1986. "Taxes and the Merger Decision: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 1855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. DeAngelo, Harry & Masulis, Ronald W., 1980. "Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-29, March.
    12. Julian R. Franks & Robert S. Harris & Cohn Mayer, 1988. "Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the United Kingdom and the United States," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 221-264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 391-405, December.
    14. Palepu, Krishna G., 1986. "Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-35, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ghosh, Aloke & Jain, Prem C., 2000. "Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 377-402, December.
    2. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    3. Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, 2008. "Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 792-819, September.
    4. Monda, Barbara & Giorgino, Marco & Modolin, Ileana, 2013. "Rationales for Corporate Risk Management - A Critical Literature Review," MPRA Paper 45420, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Low, Angie & Makhija, Anil K. & Sanders, Anthony B., 2007. "The Impact of Shareholder Power on Bondholders: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Working Paper Series 2007-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    6. Anne E. Kleffner & Neil A. Doherty, 1994. "The Effect Of Costly Risk Bearing On Insurers' Supply Decisions," Risk and Insurance 9407005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1998. "Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy," NBER Working Papers 6433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kleffner, A. E. & N. A. Doherty, 1994. "The Effect of Costly Risk Bearing on Insurers' Supply Decisions," Working Papers 022, Risk and Insurance Archive.
    9. Richard W. Kopcke, 1992. "Tobin's Q, economic rents, and the optimal stock of capital," Working Papers 92-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    10. Hilscher, Jens & Şişli-Ciamarra, Elif, 2013. "Conflicts of interest on corporate boards: The effect of creditor-directors on acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 140-158.
    11. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1991. "Taxation and the Cost of Capital: The "Old" View, the "New" View, and Another View," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 5, pages 25-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Hines, James R. & Park, Jongsang, 2019. "Investment ramifications of distortionary tax subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 36-51.
    13. Auerbach, Alan J., 2002. "Taxation and corporate financial policy," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 19, pages 1251-1292, Elsevier.
    14. Patrick Artus & Philippe Ducos & Francois Lecointe, 1992. "Rachats d'entreprise avec endettement (LBO et MBO) : motivations micro-économiques, effets sur l'efficacité des entreprises et risques macro-économiques," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 102(1), pages 89-104.
    15. Jorge Farinha & Francisco Miranda, 2003. "Run-up, toeholds, and agency effects in mergers and acquisitions: evidence from an emerging market," CEF.UP Working Papers 0311, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    16. Aivazian, Varouj A. & Qiu, Jiaping & Rahaman, Mohammad M., 2015. "Bank loan contracting and corporate diversification: Does organizational structure matter to lenders?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 252-282.
    17. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    18. Ogden, Joseph P. & Wu, Shanhong, 2013. "Reassessing the effect of growth options on leverage," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 182-195.
    19. Rym Ayadi & Emrah Arbak & Willem Pieter De Groen, 2012. "Executive Compensation and Risk-taking in European Banking," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Drobetz, Wolfgang & Pensa, Pascal & Wöhle, Claudia B., 2004. "Kapitalstrukturtheorie in Theorie und Praxis: Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenuntersuchung," Working papers 2004/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax incentives; merger motives; manager independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0242. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Elisabeth Gustafsson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iuiiise.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.