Evolution, Economic Competence, and the Market for Corporate Control
To assess the merits of the market for corporate control, this paper examines two processes which standard analysis does not study: the allocation of economic competence and the evolution of organizational structures. Economic competence is seen to be an unusual scarce resource embodied in the very ways in which individuals and organizations take economic decisions, which guides the allocation of all scarce resources, including itself. Its efficient allocation is shown to require an evolutionary trial-and-error process, where the market for corporate control plays a crucial role.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1989|
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- Sidney G. Winter, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 237-261.
- Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
- Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
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