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The Formation of Incentive Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems

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  • Pelikan, Pavel

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Pelikan, Pavel, 1986. "The Formation of Incentive Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems," Working Paper Series 155, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Forte, Francesco, 1982. "The Law of Selection in the Public Economy as Compared to the Market Economy," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 37(2), pages 224-245.
    2. Pelikan, Pavel, 1969. "Language as a Limiting Factor for Centralization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 625-631, Part I Se.
    3. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 211-211.
    4. Richard R. Nelson, 1981. "Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 93-111, Spring.
    5. Sidney G. Winter, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(2), pages 237-261.
    6. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boudreaux, Christopher, 2019. "Do private enterprises outperform state enterprises in an emerging market? The importance of institutional context in entrepreneurship," MPRA Paper 93039, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Pelikan, Pavel, 1986. "How Do New Technologies Fare under Different Institutional Rules?," Working Paper Series 169, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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