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Competition compliance: limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement

Author

Listed:
  • Lorentzen, Jochen

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Møllgaard, Peter

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, postenlargement.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorentzen, Jochen & Møllgaard, Peter, 2002. "Competition compliance: limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement," Working Papers 11-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anna Fornalczyk, 2002. "The enforcement of competition policy in the candidate countries," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 37(1), pages 52-58, January.
    2. Djankov, Simeon & Hoekman, Bernard, 1997. "Competition Law in Post-Central Planning Bulgaria," CEPR Discussion Papers 1723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Neven, Damien J & von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, 1996. "Competition Policy in Switzerland," CEPR Discussion Papers 1416, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    5. Dutz, Mark A. & Vagliasindi, Maria, 2000. "Competition policy implementation in transition economies: An empirical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 762-772, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition policy; vertical restraints; vertical agreements; Eastern Europe; EU harmonisation; subcontracting; competition law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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