The Collateral Source Rule: A Common Law Norm Under Special Interest Attack
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References listed on IDEAS
- David Schap & Andrew Feeley, 2006. "(Much) More on the Collateral Source Rule," Working Papers 0605, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-831, June.
- Epstein, Richard A, 1988. "The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 311-315, May.
- Paul Rubin, 2005. "Public choice and tort reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 223-236, July.
More about this item
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-06-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2006-06-10 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2006-06-10 (Law & Economics)
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