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Pourquoi les allocations chômage décroissent-elles avec la durée du chômage? Une revue de la littérature

Author

Listed:
  • Ophélie Cerdan

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

It is a synthesis of theoretical work explaining why the unemployment benefit is decreasing with the length of unemployment. We present various arguments in favor of degression within a single theoretical structure. We distinguish three arguments. The gradual decrease is the temporal profile best suited to reduce the disincentives to job search. Moreover, it appears as the choice politically expected because it is consistent with the preferences of the electorate majority. Finally, it presents itself as an instrument of controlling abuse of the system. Indeed, it serves to deter cheaters or those who claim to compensation even though they do not want to work.

Suggested Citation

  • Ophélie Cerdan, 2010. "Pourquoi les allocations chômage décroissent-elles avec la durée du chômage? Une revue de la littérature," Working Papers halshs-00533849, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00533849
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00533849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A, 1993. "The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 575-605, October.
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    4. Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2004. "Labor Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026203316x, December.
    5. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
    6. Wright, Randall, 1986. "The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 377-399, December.
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