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Urbanization and Electoral Success: Lawyers and Workers in Interwar France

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaël Franck

    (CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, University of Stuttgart = Universität Stuttgart)

  • Victor Gay

    (IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This study argues that urbanization changed the relationship between candidates' occupation and their electoral success. To identify the causal effect of local variation in urbanization, we exploit exogenous changes in the boundaries of electoral constituencies in the 1928, 1932, and 1936 French parliamentary elections. We find that urbanization reduced the electoral success of lawyers—who had historically dominated electoral politics—while benefiting employees and workers. This effect was concentrated on the left of the political spectrum, whereby left-wing employees and workers displaced left-wing lawyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Franck & Victor Gay, 2025. "Urbanization and Electoral Success: Lawyers and Workers in Interwar France," Working Papers hal-04364519, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04364519
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04364519v3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N94 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: 1913-

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