On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules
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- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-41, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
intellectual property; probabilistic patents; patent litigations; incremental innovations; pretrial negotiations; legal costs; imperfect competition.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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