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The theory of informal transactions in bureaucracies: some qualifications

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  • Pierre Salmon

    (IME - Institut de mathématiques économiques - UB - Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

The ambition of the paper is certainly not to change substantially Breton and Wintrobe‘s story. We can be sure that many of the different pieces that they have forged and assembled in their book v ill be replaced or modified in the course of time. This is the fate of all interesting theories. But only time-consuming and collective efforts can achieve this. The only ambition of this paper is a small beginning in that direction. Section II of the paper compares some of the mechanisms, others than trust, vhich have been proposed to explain self-enforcing exchanges. Then, Breton 8nd Wint robe's modelling of trust and trust accumulation is looked at critically in Section III. Section IV presents an alternative mechanism, inspired by the Popperian philosophy of the grovth of knovledge. Up to that point, we are concerned only vith the foundations part of the story. However, in Section Y, partly as an application of ideas presented in the previous sections and partly on the basis of some other ideas introduced at that stage, I analyze a particular kind of network, the 'transbureau" network, based on horizontal trust. Since transbureau networks are compatible with vertical trust, and moreover are efficient whenever there is enough of this vertical trust, an important prediction derived by Breton and Wi ntrobe is qualified.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Salmon, 1986. "The theory of informal transactions in bureaucracies: some qualifications," Working Papers hal-01541917, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01541917
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01541917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
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    3. Gianluigi Galeotti & Albert Breton, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Political Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 47-65, February.
    4. Coleman, James S, 1984. "Introducing Social Structure into Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 84-88, May.
    5. Scott A. Boorman, 1975. "A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job Information through Contact Networks," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 216-249, Spring.
    6. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
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    Keywords

    informal transaction; economy;

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