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Norms, advice networks and joint economic governance: the case of conflicts among shareholders at the commercial court of Paris

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  • Emmanuel Lazega

    (CSO - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Lise Mounier

    (CMH - Centre Maurice Halbwachs - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Département de Sciences sociales ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

  • Paola Tubaro

    (University of Greenwich Business School - University of Greenwich)

Abstract

Businesses are usually very keen to participate in the governance of their markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003; Falconi et al., 2005). In this chapter, we combine a sociological perspective on joint governance of markets with an economic perspective, such as that of Dixit (2009) that deals with issues of social optimality of private or public governance and enforcement institutions. Institutional and neo-institutional economic theory often separate official governance institutions from private self-governance (Greif, 1996; Ellickson, 1991; Milgrom et al., 1990; Williamson, 1985). At the inter-organizational level, at least two different sociological traditions also deal with the issue of self and exogenous governance of markets, comparing the formal and often exogenous aspects with informal and endogenous ones (...).

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Lazega & Lise Mounier & Paola Tubaro, 2011. "Norms, advice networks and joint economic governance: the case of conflicts among shareholders at the commercial court of Paris," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01054015, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01054015
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01054015
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    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5181 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n211pgu0m is not listed on IDEAS
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