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Dynamic Effects of Enforcement on Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Galbiati

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Emeric Henry

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a lab experiment , that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: a) past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate; b) when fines for non cooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer towards others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2018. "Dynamic Effects of Enforcement on Cooperation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01971468, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01971468
    DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1813502115
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01971468v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sara Lowes & Nathan Nunn & James A. Robinson & Jonathan L. Weigel, 2017. "The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence From the Kuba Kingdom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1065-1091, July.
    2. Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
    3. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2016. "Long-Term Persistence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1401-1436.
    4. Paul E. Turner & Lin Chao, 1999. "Prisoner's dilemma in an RNA virus," Nature, Nature, vol. 398(6726), pages 441-443, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fabio Galeotti & Valeria Maggian & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(638), pages 2508-2528.
    3. Philipp Chapkovski & Luca Corazzini & Valeria Maggian, 2021. "Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?," Working Papers 2021:20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    4. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet & Max Lobeck, 2021. "How laws affect the perception of norms: Empirical evidence from the lockdown," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(9), pages 1-14, September.
    5. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2024. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 165-198, December.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6unm655ita9ojbuuc83c9h0is8 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2019. "Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law," SciencePo Working papers halshs-02145486, HAL.
    8. Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1255-1293, May.
    9. Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner & Eugenio Verrina, 2021. "When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 591-615, October.
    10. Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Nicolas Jacquemet & Max Lobeck, 2021. "How laws affect the perception of norms: Empirical evidence from the lockdown," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(9), pages 1-14, September.

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