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L'Arbitrage Entreprise / Marche : Le Role Du Controle Interne

Author

Listed:
  • Eustache Ebondo

    (Ecole Supérieure de Commerce - Groupe ESC Marseille)

  • Benoit Pigé

    () (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Dans l'étude des organisations, la distinction entre le marché et l'entreprise apparaît fondée, depuis 1937 et l'article de Coase, sur l'économie des coûts de transactions. L'avantage de l'entreprise est d'être capable de gérer certaines transactions à un coût moindre que le marché, en raison notamment de l'existence de systèmes de contrôle interne qui permettent une meilleure prise en compte des spécificités des transactions et assurent une limitation de la latitude discrétionnaire de chacun en présence d'une asymétrie d'information. Le développement des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication, cumulé avec un accroissement des connaissances et une spécialisation des savoirs, entraîne la nécessité de repenser la notion d'organisation en fonction des avantages comparatifs de celle-ci, avantages fondés sur les mécanismes de contrôle interne existants ou à mettre en oeuvre.

Suggested Citation

  • Eustache Ebondo & Benoit Pigé, 2001. "L'Arbitrage Entreprise / Marche : Le Role Du Controle Interne," Post-Print halshs-00584627, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00584627
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00584627
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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