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Origins of the Maturity and Currency Mismatches in the Balance Sheet of Emerging Countries: a Theoretical Approach

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  • Irina Bunda

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans [2008-2011] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to highlight the origins of the currency and maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of emerging countries. We show that short-term debt in the form of demandable debt works as a commitment device of the financial intermediary and as a form of protection of foreign lenders in a context of poor enforceability of contracts. The currency mismatch in the non-tradable sector is mainly viewed as a supply-side phenomenon. It results from the choice of foreign lenders whose anticipations of exchange rate risk overpass those of default of the banking and/or private sector following a real adverse shock. Finally, when it comes to simultaneously explain the maturity and the currency composition of debt, the paper shows that the short-term foreign currency denominated debt, with the option of early withdrawal of the demandable debt, allows investors to offset the debtor default risk if a currency depreciation occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Irina Bunda, 2003. "Origins of the Maturity and Currency Mismatches in the Balance Sheet of Emerging Countries: a Theoretical Approach," Post-Print halshs-00424465, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00424465
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00424465
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    References listed on IDEAS

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