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The Failure of a Pure Patent Market

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  • Christian Bessy

    (IDHES - Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Économie et de la Société - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay, ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay)

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the movement to make patents a new asset class, and its relative failure. Our thesis is that this creation is largely dependent on the construction of a market devoted to transactions in patents, and not just in technology licenses, and on the emergence of new intellectual property intermediaries akin to finance, whose activity must nevertheless be regulated. Our analysis is based on the various patent valuation conventions that underpin its institutionalization and the variety of its uses.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Bessy, 2023. "The Failure of a Pure Patent Market," Post-Print hal-04236590, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04236590
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0079
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04236590v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, 2012. "Elves or Trolls? The role of nonpracticing patent owners in the innovation economy," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(1), pages 73-94, February.
    2. Julien Pénin, 2012. "Strategic uses of patents in markets for technology: A story of fabless firms, brokers and trolls," Post-Print hal-04061575, HAL.
    3. Christian Bessy, 2006. "“Organisations intermédiaires et accords de licence de technologie »," Post-Print hal-00292433, HAL.
    4. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, 2013. "The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, Winter.
    5. Christian Bessy, 2006. "Organisations intermédiaires et accords de licence de technologie," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 3-3.
    6. Appel, Ian & Farre-Mensa, Joan & Simintzi, Elena, 2019. "Patent trolls and startup employment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(3), pages 708-725.
    7. Pénin, Julien, 2012. "Strategic uses of patents in markets for technology: A story of fabless firms, brokers and trolls," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 633-641.
    8. Caves, Richard E & Crookell, Harold & Killing, J Peter, 1983. "The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 45(3), pages 249-267, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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