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Business history and European integration: How EEC competition policy affected companies’ strategies. Introduction

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  • Neil Rollings

    (University of Glasgow)

  • Laurent Warlouzet

    (SIRICE - Sorbonne, Identités, relations internationales et civilisations de l’Europe - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Neil Rollings & Laurent Warlouzet, 2020. "Business history and European integration: How EEC competition policy affected companies’ strategies. Introduction," Post-Print hal-03911492, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03911492
    DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2018.1488966
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03911492v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ssct5c4v093a9sfpao3qpcgr6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hubert Buch-Hansen & Clement Levallois, 2015. "The Scale and Geography of Collusion in the European Market: A Longitudinal View," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 737-752, July.
    3. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2011. "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 455-492.
    4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March.
    5. Sauter, Wolf, 1997. "Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198264934, Decembrie.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ssct5c4v093a9sfpao3qpcgr6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Dominique Barjot, 2013. "Les cartels, une voie vers l'intégration européenne ?. Le rôle de Louis Loucheur (1872-1931)," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(6), pages 1043-1066.
    8. Bouwens, Bram & Dankers, Joost, 2010. "The Invisible Handshake:Cartelization in the Netherlands, 1930–2000," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 751-771, January.
    9. Levenstein, Margaret C., 1996. "Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel before World War I," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-137, January.
    10. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
    11. Robert M. Feinberg, 1985. "The Enforcement and Effects of European Competition Policy: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 373-384, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alice Milor, 2024. "Non‐documents for Big Decisions: The Commission and the EEC–Japan Automotive Agreement (1991)," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(6), pages 1654-1671, November.

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