Cartels – Between Theory, Leniency Policy And Fines
Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to the competitive environment. Cartel participation is sanctioned both by national and community legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In order to facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, instructions promoting a leniency program were elaborated at European Commission level, encouraging the participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the detection of an even greater number of such practices.
Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000.
"Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
- Kovacic, William E. & Shapiro, Carl, 1999. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt5zb4g387, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Law and Economics 0303006, EconWPA.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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