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Do differences in brute luck influence preferences for redistribution in favour of the environment and health?

Author

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  • Olivier Chanel

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pavitra Paul

    (CSH - Centre de sciences humaines de New Delhi - MEAE - Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Redistributive justice is based on the premise that it is unfair for people to be better or worse off relative to others simply because of their fortune or misfortune. It assumes equal opportunities arising from four factors: social circumstances, effort, option luck and brute luck. This paper seeks to investigate how differences in perceived brute luck influence individual preferences for redistribution in favour of two public policies: "health intervention" and "environmental actions". These policies are viewed somewhat differently: the environment is considered a pure "public good" and health, more as a "private good" with a strong public good element. Consequently, potential self-serving biases inherent in the preferences for redistributive policies are expected to differ, more likely favouring health than the environment. The perceived degree of brute luck may capture such a difference—those perceiving themselves as luckiest should be less amenable to redistribution in favour of health than the unluckiest. Data from the three waves (2000, 2006 and 2008) of a French population survey are used to examine this self-serving bias. A Generalised Ordered Logit (GOL) model is found to be statistically more relevant compared to other logistic regression models (multinomial and ordered). We find that a perceived low degree of brute luck is significantly associated with a decreased preference of redistributive environmental policies but the reverse is true for redistributive health policies, i.e., association with an increased preference. Assuming that all inequalities due to differing luck are unjust, this empirical validation gives redistributive justice grounds for equalisation policies regarding health.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Chanel & Pavitra Paul, 2022. "Do differences in brute luck influence preferences for redistribution in favour of the environment and health?," Post-Print hal-03798772, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03798772
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-022-01346-7
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03798772v1
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