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Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Hélène Couprie

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Francois Cochard

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Astrid Hopfensitz

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

This study makes a significant contribution to investigations of household behavior by testing for a willingness to cooperate and share income by men and women who are either in couple with each other or complete strangers. We present results from an economic experiment conducted with 100 co-habiting heterosexual couples. We compare defection behavior in the prisoner's dilemma within real couples to pairs of strangers. One out of four participants chose not to cooperatewith their spouse. To understand why spouses might prefer defection, we use a novel allocation task to elicit the individual's trade-off between efficiency and equality within a couple. We further investigate the impact of socio-demographic and psychological characteristics of the couples. We find in particular that lack of preferences for joint income maximization, having children and being married lead to higher defection rates in the social dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Hélène Couprie & Francois Cochard & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2016. "Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation," Post-Print hal-02980204, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02980204
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-014-9276-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Leanne Roncolato & Alex Roomets, 2020. "Who will change the “baby?” Examining the power of gender in an experimental setting," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 823-852, September.
    3. François Cochard & Hélène Couprie & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2018. "What if women earned more than their spouses? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 50-71, March.
    4. Basu, Arnab & Dimova, Ralitza & Gbakou, Monnet & Viennet, Romane, 2023. "Parental risk preferences, maternal bargaining power, and the educational progressions of children: Lab-in-the-field evidence from rural Côte d'Ivoire," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Takuya Obara & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2024. "Optimal taxation in an endogenous fertility model with non-cooperative behavior," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 173-197, March.
    6. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," Working Papers hal-02365239, HAL.
    7. Boto-García, David & Mariel, Petr & Baños-Pino, José Francisco, 2023. "Intra-household bargaining for a joint vacation," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    8. Onah, Michael Nnachebe & Horton, Susan, 2018. "Male-female differences in households' resource allocation and decision to seek healthcare in south-eastern Nigeria: Results from a mixed methods study," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 84-91.
    9. Zheng, Jiakun & Couprie, Helene & Hopfensitz, Astrid, 2022. "Collective risk taking by couples: individual vs household risk," MPRA Paper 116537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Arjan Verschoor & Bereket Kebede & Alistair Munro & Marcela Tarazona, 2019. "Spousal Control and Efficiency of Intra-household Decision-Making: Experiments among Married Couples in India, Ethiopia and Nigeria," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 31(4), pages 1171-1196, September.
    11. Sevias Guvuriro & Frederik Booysen, 2020. "Intra-household cooperation and inter-generational communication in the extended family: a field experiment in a poor urban community in Africa," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 635-653, September.
    12. Luise Görges, 2021. "Of housewives and feminists: Gender norms and intra-household division of labour," Working Paper Series in Economics 400, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    13. David Boto-García & Petr Mariel & José Baños Pino & Antonio Alvarez, 2022. "Tourists’ willingness to pay for holiday trip characteristics: A Discrete Choice Experiment," Tourism Economics, , vol. 28(2), pages 349-370, March.
    14. Nacka, Marina & Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo, 2024. "Women's Empowerment and Intra-Household Bargaining Power," MPRA Paper 120095, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Savita Kulkarni & Anirudh Tagat & Hansika Kapoor, 2016. "An experimental investigation of intra-household resource allocation in rural India," Working Papers PIERI 2016-20, PEP-PIERI.
    16. Takuya Obara & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2020. "Optimal Taxation in an Endogenous Fertility Model with Non-Cooperative Couples," Discussion Paper Series 211, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2021.
    17. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," TEPP Working Paper 2019-05, TEPP.
    18. Lespiau, Florence & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Kaminski, Gwenaël, 2021. "Keeping it for yourself or your sister? Experimental evidence on birth order effects on resource distribution between kin and non-kin," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    19. Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger, 2017. "Do husbands and wives pool their incomes? A couple experiment," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 779-805, September.
    20. Matthew Gnagey & Therese Grijalva & Rong Rong, 2020. "Spousal influence and assortative mating on time preferences: a field experiment in the USA," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 461-512, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner dilemma; Experiment on couples; Household; Cooperation; Efficiency versus Equality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation

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