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What if women earned more than their spouse? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples

Author

Listed:
  • Hélène Couprie

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Francois Cochard

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Astrid Hopfensitz

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division is known as the "work-division puzzle". Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized as competing explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context and productivity to investigate preferences for work-division by true co-habiting couples, in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the "advantaged" player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. Women and men contribute equally to the household public good in all conditions. This result allows us to rule out some of the standard explanations of the work-division puzzle.

Suggested Citation

  • Hélène Couprie & Francois Cochard & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2018. "What if women earned more than their spouse? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples," Post-Print hal-02980557, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02980557
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9524-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Leanne Roncolato & Alex Roomets, 2020. "Who will change the “baby?” Examining the power of gender in an experimental setting," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 823-852, September.
    2. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," Working Papers hal-02365239, HAL.
    3. Valerio Capraro, 2020. "Gender differences in the trade-off between objective equality and efficiency," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(4), pages 534-544, July.
    4. José Alberto Molina & Jorge Velilla & Helena Ibarra, 2023. "Intrahousehold Bargaining Power in Spain: An Empirical Test of the Collective Model," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 84-97, March.
    5. Hundsdoerfer, Jochen & Matthaei, Eva Kristina, 2020. "Gender discriminatory taxes, fairness perception, and labor supply," Discussion Papers 2020/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    6. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," TEPP Working Paper 2019-05, TEPP.
    7. Lespiau, Florence & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Kaminski, Gwenaël, 2021. "Keeping it for yourself or your sister? Experimental evidence on birth order effects on resource distribution between kin and non-kin," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    8. Zhang, Peilu & Zhang, Yinjunjie & Palma, Marco, 2018. "Social Norms and Competitiveness: My Willingness to Compete Depends on Who I am (supposed to be)," MPRA Paper 89727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. José Alberto Molina & Alfredo Ferrer & J. Ignacio Giménez-Nadal & Carlos Gracia-Lázaro & Yamir Moreno & Angel Sánchez, 2019. "Intergenerational cooperation within the household: a Public Good game with three generations," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 535-552, June.
    10. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Görges, Luise, 2021. "Of housewives and feminists: Gender norms and intra-household division of labour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    12. Masekesa, Faith & Munro, Alistair, 2020. "Intra-household inequality, fairness and productivity. Evidence from a real effort experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    13. Luise Görges, 2021. "Of housewives and feminists: Gender norms and intra-household division of labour," Working Paper Series in Economics 400, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    14. Zhang, Peilu & Zhang, Yinjunjie & Palma, Marco A., 2024. "Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 125-151.
    15. David Boto-García & Petr Mariel, 2024. "How well do couples know their partners’ preferences? Experimental evidence from joint recreation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 41(3), pages 657-686, October.
    16. repec:diw:diwwpp:dp1593 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Begoña Álvarez & Daniel Miles-Touya, 2019. "Gender imbalance in housework allocation: a question of time?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1257-1287, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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