Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2 Emission in Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory
The sustainability of supply chain,both economical and ecological, has attracted intensive attentions of academic and industry. It is proven in former works that supply chain pooling given by horizontal cooperation among several independent supply chains create a new common supply chain network that could reduce the costs and the transport CO2 emissions. In this regard, this paper introduces a scheme to share in a fairly manner the savings. After a summary of the concept of pooled-supply-networks optimization and CO2 emission model, we use cooperative game theory as the cooperative mechanism for the implementation of the horizontal pooling. Since we proved the related pooling game to be super-additive, a fair and stable allocation of common gain in transportation cost and CO2 emission is calculated by Shapley Value concept. Through a case study, the results show that supply chains pooling can result in reductions of both transportation cost and carbon emissions, and that the increase of carbon-tax rate gives enterprises more incentives for the implementation of such pooling scheme.
|Date of creation:||23 May 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published - Presented, INCOM 2012, 2012, Bucharest, Romania|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00733491|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cruijssen, F.C.A.M. & Salomon, M., 2004. "Empirical Study : Order Sharing Between Transportation Companies may Result in Cost Reductions Between 5 to 15 Percent," Discussion Paper 2004-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
- Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2008.
"Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games,"
- Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games," Post-Print ujm-00162456, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games," Post-Print ujm-00176491, HAL.
- Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-57, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games," Post-Print ujm-00176488, HAL.
- McKinnon, A.C. & Piecyk, M.I., 2009. "Measurement of CO2 emissions from road freight transport: A review of UK experience," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3733-3742, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00733491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.