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Les plateformes d'innovation sur Internet : arrangements contractuels, intermédiation et gestion de la propriété intellectuelle

Author

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  • Isabelle Liotard

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

L'innovation des entreprises passe depuis une période récente par de nouveaux canaux instaurés via Internet : les plateformes d'innovation. De telles structures d'intermédiation mettent en relation des entreprises en panne de solution pour leur R&D avec des internautes du monde entier (scientifiques, universitaires, chercheurs, retraités...). Le défi ainsi posté sur la plateforme est récompensé par une prime s'il est retenu. L'objet de l'article est d'analyser les arrangements contractuels qui sont à l'œuvre sur une plateforme spécifique (Innocentive), que ce soit en matière de propriété intellectuelle et de transferts de droit entre acteurs, ou d'aide et de supports techniques proposés à l'entreprise pour détecter les meilleurs solutions au défi. Il s'agit également de comprendre comment ces dispositifs répondent au problème d'asymétrie d'information et d'incertitude inhérent aux transferts de technologie, et largement mis en évidence dans la littérature économique.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Liotard, 2012. "Les plateformes d'innovation sur Internet : arrangements contractuels, intermédiation et gestion de la propriété intellectuelle," Post-Print hal-00680366, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00680366
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00680366v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Iciar Pavez & Jean Marie Codron, 2018. "Contractual price provisions and their determinants in conditions of uncertainty: the case of Chilean fruit exports [Dispositions contractuelles sur les prix et leurs déterminants dans des conditio," Post-Print hal-02618927, HAL.
    2. Isabelle Liotard & Valérie Revest, 2015. "Innocentive Un modèle hybride d'innovation basé sur l'appel à la foule et l'Innovation Ouverte," Post-Print halshs-01302451, HAL.

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    Keywords

    innovation; plateforme d'innovation; propriété intellectuelle; licences; asymétrie d'information; intermédiation; Innocentive;
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