The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibrium
We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2012.65 - ISSN : 1955-611X - Version rév.. 2012|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00748215v2|
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