IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gwi/wpaper/2020-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • David Szakonyi

    (George Washington University)

Abstract

Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet we know little about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this paper argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, I focus on one widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from accessing the ballot. First, in survey experiments, Russian voters respond less negatively to institutional manipulations, such as rejecting candidates, than to blatant fraud, such as ballot-box stuffing. Next, using evidence from 25,935 Russian mayoral races, I show that lower societal and implementation costs enable incumbents to strategically reject candidacies from credible challengers and then reduce their electoral vulnerability. In all, the technology behind specific manipulations helps determine when and how incumbents violate electoral integrity.

Suggested Citation

  • David Szakonyi, 2020. "Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia," Working Papers 2020-23, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2020WP/SzakonyiIIEP2020-23.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Szakonyi, 2018. "Private Sector Policymaking," Working Papers 2018-8, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    2. Tomila Lankina & Alisa Voznaya, 2015. "New Data on Protest Trends in Russia's Regions," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 67(2), pages 327-342, February.
    3. Nichter, Simeon, 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 19-31, February.
    4. Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2019. "Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 552-568, May.
    5. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," NBER Working Papers 20519, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Simpser,Alberto, 2013. "Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030541, October.
    7. Miguel R. Rueda, 2017. "Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(1), pages 163-177, January.
    8. Jody LaPorte, 2015. "Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(4), pages 339-366, July.
    9. Regina Smyth & Rostislav Turovsky, 2018. "Legitimising Victories: Electoral Authoritarian Control in Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 70(2), pages 182-201, February.
    10. Cameron Ross, 2018. "Regional elections in Russia: instruments of authoritarian legitimacy or instability?," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 4(1), pages 1-9, December.
    11. Frye, Timothy & Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2019. "Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 857-881, July.
    12. Frye, Timothy & Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2019. "Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia – CORRIGENDUM," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 882-882, July.
    13. Rundlett, Ashlea & Svolik, Milan W., 2016. "Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 180-197, February.
    14. Grigorii Golosov, 2011. "Russia's Regional Legislative Elections, 2003–2007: Authoritarianism Incorporated," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(3), pages 397-414.
    15. Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2015. "Online Social Media and Political Awareness in Authoritarian Regimes," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 29-51, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Rochlitz & Evgeniya Mitrokhina & Irina Nizovkina, 2020. "Bureaucratic Discrimination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: Experimental Evidence from Russia," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2010, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    2. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    3. David Szakonyi & Ora John Reuter, 2020. "Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia," Working Papers 2020-19, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    4. Vladimir Shchukin & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2022. "Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 3-34, January.
    5. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    6. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2020. "Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 183-213, October.
    7. Bowles, Jeremy & Larreguy, Horacio & Woller, Anders, 2020. "Information Versus Control: The Electoral Consequences of Polling Place Creation," TSE Working Papers 20-1154, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    8. Valeria Babayan & Israel Marques II & Michael Mironyuk & Aleksei Turobov, 2021. "Public Trust In Internet Voting Systems: Evidence From Russian Public Opinion," HSE Working papers WP BRP 83/PS/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    10. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    11. Christopher W. Blair & Jonathan A. Chu & Joshua A. Schwartz, 2022. "The Two Faces of Opposition to Chemical Weapons: Sincere Versus Insincere Norm-Holders," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(4-5), pages 677-703, May.
    12. Jeremiah O. Arowosegbe, 2020. "Academics and Election Administration in Nigeria," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(7), pages 1009-1032, October.
    13. Aluykov, Maxim & Gilev, Aleksei & Nadporozhskii, Ilia & Vyrskaia, Marina & Rumiantseva, Aleksandra & Zavadskaya, Margarita, 2024. "Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA) Wave 2," OSF Preprints g4an5, Center for Open Science.
    14. Hager, Anselm & Hennicke, Moritz & Krause, Werner & Mergele, Lukas, 2021. "Privatizations Spark Socialist Backlash: Evidence from East Germany’s Transformation," OSF Preprints cmsyn, Center for Open Science.
    15. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2021. "Redistributive politics in Russia: The political economy of agricultural subsidies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 63(1), pages 1-30.
    16. Frye, Timothy & Borisova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Elections, protest and trust in government: A natural experiment from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2016, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    17. Ravanilla, Nico & Hicken, Allen, 2023. "Poverty, social networks, and clientelism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    18. Anand Murugesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2023. "The Puzzling Practice of Paying “Cash for Votes”," CESifo Working Paper Series 10504, CESifo.
    19. Gallego, Jorge & Guardado, Jenny & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Do gifts buy votes? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    20. Gustavo J. Bobonis & Paul J. Gertler & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Simeon Nichter, 2022. "Vulnerability and Clientelism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3627-3659, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    electoral fraud; authoritarianism; Russia; public opinion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kyle Renner (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iigwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.