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Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

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  • REUTER, ORA JOHN
  • SZAKONYI, DAVID

Abstract

Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime’s willingness to provide spoils. Regimes that share power with the opposition, limit access to spoils, and lack formal institutions see more defections. Co-opting the opposition assuages outside threats but leaves regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defection. Those with personal followings and business connections are the most likely to defect, since they can pursue their political goals independently of the regime. Taken together, our results highlight important tradeoffs among authoritarian survival strategies. Many of the steps autocrats take to repel challenges simultaneously heighten the risk of defections.

Suggested Citation

  • Reuter, Ora John & Szakonyi, David, 2019. "Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 552-568, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:02:p:552-568_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher A. Hartwell, 2023. "In our (frozen) backyard: the Eurasian Union and regional environmental governance in the Arctic," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(4), pages 1-22, April.
    2. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Indecent Disclosures: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Political Selection," Working Papers 2020-21, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    4. Hartwell, Christopher A. & Otrachshenko, Vladimir & Popova, Olga, 2021. "Waxing power, waning pollution: The effect of COVID-19 on Russian environmental policymaking," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    5. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia," Working Papers 2020-23, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.

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