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Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud

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  • RUNDLETT, ASHLEA
  • SVOLIK, MILAN W.

Abstract

Most electoral fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a multitude of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of electoral fraud by studying the perverse consequences of incentive conflicts between incumbents and their local agents. These incentive conflicts result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. Our analysis of the political organization of electoral fraud explains why even popular incumbents often preside over seemingly unnecessary fraud, why fraud sometimes fails to deliver victories, and it predicts that the extent of fraud should be increasing in both the incumbent’s genuine support and reported results across precincts. A statistical analysis of anomalies in precinct-level results from the 2011–2012 Russian legislative and presidential elections provides preliminary support for our key claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Rundlett, Ashlea & Svolik, Milan W., 2016. "Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 180-197, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:110:y:2016:i:01:p:180-197_00
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    Cited by:

    1. David Szakonyi & Ora John Reuter, 2020. "Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia," Working Papers 2020-19, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    2. Casas, Agustín & Díaz, Guillermo & Trindade, André, 2017. "Who monitors the monitor? Effect of party observers on electoral outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 136-149.
    3. Hao Hong & Tsz-Ning Wong, 2020. "Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 460-493, July.
    4. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    5. Leeffers, Stefan & Vicente, Pedro C., 2019. "Does electoral observation influence electoral results? Experimental evidence for domestic and international observers in Mozambique," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 42-58.
    6. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2020. "Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 183-213, October.
    7. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    8. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia," Working Papers 2020-23, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    9. Michael Wahman & Edward Goldring, 2020. "Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 93-110, January.

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