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Bank leverage limits and regulatory arbitrage: new evidence on a recurring question

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Abstract

Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it took effect in 2018. Security-level analysis suggests banks actively added riskier securities, rather than merely shedding safer ones. Despite the risk-shifting, overall bank risk did not increase, evidently because the banks most constrained by the new leverage rule significantly increased leverage capital ratios.

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  • Dong Beom Choi & Michael R. Holcomb & Donald P. Morgan, 2018. "Bank leverage limits and regulatory arbitrage: new evidence on a recurring question," Staff Reports 856, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:856
    Note: Revised December 2019. Previous title: “Leverage Limits and Bank Risk: New Evidence on an Old Question”
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    Cited by:

    1. Neamtu, Ioana & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2021. "Capital allocation, the leverage ratio requirement," Bank of England working papers 956, Bank of England.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel III regulations; bank risk; leverage limits; regulatory arbitrage; reaching for yield;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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