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Extended Supplement to “Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information”

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Bloedel
  • R. Vijay Krishna
  • Oksana Leukhina

Abstract

This supplement contains auxiliary technical results and proofs omitted from Bloedel, Krishna, and Leukhina (2025) (henceforth BKL) and its Supplemental Appendix (henceforth SA). First, Section I proves parts (a)–(c) and (e)–(f) of Theorem 3 from Appendix B.1 of BKL. (Part (d) of Theorem 3 is proved in SA-E.1 of BKL.) Second, Section J proves Proposition 3.2 from Section 3.3 of BKL and Lemma B.2 from Appendix B.2 of BKL. Finally, Section K proves supporting facts for Properties (a)–(e) from Section 5.2 of BKL. Throughout, we follow the numbering and labeling conventions from BKL and its SA.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2025. "Extended Supplement to “Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information”," Working Papers 2025-012, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:100057
    DOI: 10.20955/wp.2025.012
    Note: Extended supplement to Econometrica article: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20404. Related working paper: https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2018.020
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    File Function: Extended supplement to Econometrica article: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20404
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. David M. Kreps, 1977. "Decision Problems with Expected Utility Critera, I: Upper and Lower Convergent Utility," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 45-53, February.
    4. Takashi Kamihigashi, 2014. "Elementary results on solutions to the bellman equation of dynamic programming: existence, uniqueness, and convergence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 251-273, June.
    5. David M. Kreps, 1977. "Decision Problems with Expected Utility Criteria, II: Stationarity," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 266-274, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    immiseration; insurance; inequality; backloaded incentives; recursive contracts; persistent private information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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