Extended Supplement to “Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information”
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2025.012
Note: Extended supplement to Econometrica article: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20404. Related working paper: https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2018.020
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More about this item
Keywords
immiseration; insurance; inequality; backloaded incentives; recursive contracts; persistent private information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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