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Explaining the Life Cycle of Bank-Sponsored Money Market Funds: An Application of the Regulatory Dialectic

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Abstract

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of the regulatory dialectic in the prime institutional money market fund (PI-MMF) industry. The “regulatory dialectic”, developed by Kane (1977, 1981), describes how banks and regulators react to each other. For decades, a cap on commercial deposit interest rates fueled dramatic growth in bank-sponsored PI-MMFs as a form of shadow banking. During the growth period, banks with more commercial deposits were more likely to enter the PI-MMF industry in an effort to keep their commercial customers in affiliated subsidiaries. However, the 2008 crisis and subsequent regulatory changes halted the rapid growth of PI-MMFs. In the post-crisis regulatory regime, bank-sponsored funds were more likely to exit the industry than nonbank-sponsored funds. Simultaneously, the industry shifted from PI-MMFs to government institutional MMFs as substitute products. We conjecture that the collapse of the PI-MMF can lead further to the emergence of substitute products, such as stablecoins as part of the continuing dialectical process.

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  • Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach & Haluk Unal & Chengjun Wu, 2024. "Explaining the Life Cycle of Bank-Sponsored Money Market Funds: An Application of the Regulatory Dialectic," Research Working Paper RWP 24-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkrw:97778
    DOI: 10.18651/RWP2024-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kane, Edward J, 1977. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case against Selective Credit Allocation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 55-69, February.
    2. Garth Saloner & Andrea Shepard, 1995. "Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Teller Machines," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 479-501, Autumn.
    3. Suzi Kerr & Richard G. Newell, 2003. "Policy‐Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 317-343, September.
    4. Aigbe Akhigbe & Jeff Madura & Ann Whyte, 2004. "Partial Anticipation and the Gains to Bank Merger Targets," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 55-71, August.
    5. Vladimir Yankov, 2020. "The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Corporate Liquidity Management," FEDS Notes 2020-02-26, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 355-367, May.
    7. Burcu Duygan-Bump & Patrick Parkinson & Eric Rosengren & Gustavo A. Suarez & Paul Willen, 2013. "How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(2), pages 715-737, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank; bank holding company; bank run; financial crisis; liquidity risk; money market funds; systemic financial risk; too big to fail;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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