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Bank capital standards for market risk: a welfare analysis

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  • David A. Marshall
  • Subu Venkataraman

Abstract

We develop a model of commodity money and use it to analyze the following two questions motivated by issues in monetary history: What are the conditions under which Gresham's Law holds? And, what are the mechanics of a debasement (lowering the metallic content of coins)? The model contains light and heavy coins, imperfect information, and prices determined via bilateral bargaining. There are equilibria with neither, both, or only one type of coin in circulation. When both circulate, coins may trade by weight or by tale. We discuss the extent to which Gresham's Law holds in the various cases. Following a debasement, the quantity of reminting depends on the incentives oered by the sovereign. Equilibria exist with positive seigniorage and a mixture of old and new coins in circulation.

Suggested Citation

  • David A. Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1997. "Bank capital standards for market risk: a welfare analysis," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhfi:wp-97-09
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    Cited by:

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    2. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Solvency regulations and the management of banking risks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 981-990, April.
    3. Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, 2007. "Pillar 1 versus Pillar 2 under Risk Management," NBER Chapters, in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 377-409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. João A. C. Santos, 2001. "Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(2), pages 41-84, May.
    5. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 137-143.
    6. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    7. Milne, Alistair, 2002. "Bank capital regulation as an incentive mechanism: Implications for portfolio choice," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-23, January.
    8. Jezabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 37-56.

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