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Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat

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  • Jezabel Couppey
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    [eng] Towards a new scheme of prudential regulation : a contribution to the debate This article presents a new scheme of prudential regulation with three characteristics, which could lead regulation towards improved efficiency. First, this scheme is three-fold, because it combines regulation, internal control and market discipline. The regulation starts with « pre-commitment » and imposes a solvency rule in the case of a regulated agent defection. The pre-commitment allows for the integration of the internal control ; market discipline is provided by a public disclosure constraint concerning the institution’s solvability. Second, it is dynamic because it takes into account, period by period, the regulator and regulated agents’ reactions. Third, it is global since it is intended to be applied to all regulated financial intermediaries (banking institutions, investment enterprises and insurance companies). JEL Classification : D82, G2, G28, L51 [fre] Cet article propose un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle qui présente trois caractéristiques fondamentales propres à guider la réglementation vers une plus grande efficacité. Premièrement, ce schéma est un « tryptique régulateur » au sens où il intègre la réglementation, le contrôle interne et la discipline de marché. La réglementation prend la forme d’un processus de coercition graduée combinant dans le temps la flexibilité du « pré-engagement » à la rigueur d’une règle stricte de solvabilité en fonction de la conformité de l’établissement visé à son engagement en capital. Le préengagement initiant le schéma permet l’intégration complète du contrôle interne, tandis que la discipline de marché est activée par une procédure de «divulgation publique » des informations concernant la solvabilité de l’établissement. Deuxièmement, il est «dynamique » au sens où il tient compte, de période en période, des réactions possibles des agents (réglementés et régulateur). Troisièmement, il est « global » car son application vise l’ensemble des intermédiaires financiers réglementés (établissements de crédit, entreprises d’investissement et entreprises d’assurance). Classification JEL : D82, G2, G28, L51

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

    Volume (Year): 56 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 37-56

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3812
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
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    1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    2. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-128, February.
    3. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1999. "Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-157.
    4. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Proceedings 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Paul H. Kupiec, 1995. "Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement models," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. James L. Pierce, 1993. "The functional approach to deposit insurance and regulation," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 111-130.
    7. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "The use of bank trading risk models for regulatory capital purposes," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-50.
    9. George J. Benston, 1993. "Market discipline: the role of uninsured depositors and other market participants," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 65-95.
    10. Raj Aggarwal & Kevin T. Jacques, 1998. "Assessing the impact of prompt corrective action on bank capital and risk," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 23-32.
    11. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. David H. Pyle., 1997. "Bank Risk Management: Theory," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-272, University of California at Berkeley.
    13. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
    14. David A. Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1996. "Bank capital for market risk: a study in incentive compatible regulation," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr.
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