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Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat

Author

Listed:
  • Jézabel Couppey

    (TEAM - Université Paris 1)

Abstract

The financial and banking instability of recent years gave rise to a debate concerning the appropriateness of a prudential regulation reform. This article contributes to this debate by proposing a new scheme of prudential regulation that presents three fundamental characteristics to improve the regulation efficiency. First, this scheme can be defined as a "regulatory triptych" integrating the three modes of regulation operating in the financial and banking sphere: regulation, internal control and market discipline. Second, it is "dynamic and incentive compatible" in the sense that it takes into account, period by period, of the possible reactions the agents (regulated and regulating) and implements instruments to insure the compatibility of agents incentives. Third, it is "global" (and not based on the institution) because its application concerns all regulated financial intermediaires (banks, investment entreprises and insurance companies). Indeed, the institutional nature of prudential systems seems us to be one of essential causes of their inefficiency

Suggested Citation

  • Jézabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla00006, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla00006
    as

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    File URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42905154
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dana Jr. James D., 1993. "The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 288-310, April.
    2. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    3. George J. Benston, 1993. "Market discipline: the role of uninsured depositors and other market participants," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 65-95.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial intermediation; prudential regulation; internal control; market discipline; pre-commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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