Foreclosures: relationship lending in the consumer market and its aftermath
Relationship lending theory suggests that lenders in close proximity to their borrowers might be the most efficient providers of screening and monitoring services, because the cost of collecting information declines with distance. The author presents evidence that ties bank branch presence to borrower performance in the low-income housing market, which provides support for this theory.
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- Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 967-1000.
- Winton Andrew, 1995. "Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in a Finite Economy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 158-187, April.
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