IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2004.14.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers

Author

Listed:
  • Gadi Fibich

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University)

  • Arieh Gavious

    (School of Industrial Engineering and Management, Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Ben-Gurion University)

  • Aner Sela

    (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University)

Abstract

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious & Aner Sela, 2004. "All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers," Working Papers 2004.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2004/NDL2004-014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
    2. Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven, 2010. "An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 974-997, November.
    3. Fehr, Dietmar & Schmid, Julia, 2010. "Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2010-04, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. Noussair, C.N. & Silver, J., 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Other publications TiSEM 9833c8a8-7aa4-4529-a617-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Noussair, Charles & Silver, Jonathon, 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 189-206, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private-value auctions; Risk aversion; Perturbation analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.