All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
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References listed on IDEAS
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
- Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven, 2010.
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- Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven, 2008. "An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction," MPRA Paper 8604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
KeywordsPrivate-value auctions; Risk aversion; Perturbation analysis;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-07-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2004-07-18 (Microeconomics)
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