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All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers

Author

Listed:
  • Gadi Fibich

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University)

  • Arieh Gavious

    (School of Industrial Engineering and Management, Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Ben-Gurion University)

  • Aner Sela

    (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University)

Abstract

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious & Aner Sela, 2004. "All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers," Working Papers 2004.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Todd Kaplan & Israel Luski & Aner Sela & David Wettstein, 2002. "All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 417-430, December.
    2. Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022. "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
    3. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    4. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    5. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fehr, Dietmar & Schmid, Julia, 2010. "Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2010-04, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2010. "Less fighting than expected," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 347-367, July.
    3. Noussair, C.N. & Silver, J., 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Other publications TiSEM 9833c8a8-7aa4-4529-a617-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Noussair, Charles & Silver, Jonathon, 2006. "Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 189-206, April.
    5. Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Tucker, Steven, 2010. "An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 974-997, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private-value auctions; Risk aversion; Perturbation analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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