How to Choose the European Executive: A Counterfactual Analysis (1979-1999)
In this paper, we use data on roll-call votes by MEP’s in the five elected EuropeanParliaments (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999) to evaluate the likely impact of current proposalsin the Convention on the Future of Europe for the appointment of the European executive. Wefind (a) that the different procedures for appointing the Commission lead to quite differentresults in terms of the composition of the Commission, (b) that election of the President of theCommission by the national parliaments (our preferred mode of appointment) gives the resultthat is most in line with the observed composition of the Commission since 1979, whereas (c)election by the European Parliament creates a ‘built-in’ form of divided government betweenthe Council and the Commissio n that could prove counterproductive for the functioning ofEuropean institutions.
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- Abdul Noury, 2000.
"Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1285, Econometric Society.
- Abdul Ghafar Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002.
"More power to the European Parliament?,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/7760, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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