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The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules


  • Sébastien Courtin

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Mathieu Martin

    () (THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, France.)

  • Issofa Moyouwou

    () (University of Yaounde I, Department of Mathematics,)


According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under the q-majority. Closed form representations are obtained for the q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules (simple and sequential) in three-candidate elections. This efficiency is significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2013. "The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules," THEMA Working Papers 2013-29, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-29

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
    2. Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2015. "Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 229-245, September.
    3. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 685-688, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2016. "Refining measures of group mutual coherence," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1845-1870, July.
    2. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2016. "Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 941-966, September.

    More about this item


    Positional rules (Simple and Sequential) • Condorcet efficiency • q-majority;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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