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Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

Author

Listed:
  • Sébastien Courtin

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Mathieu Martin

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Bertrand Tchantcho

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise
    University of Yaounde I)

Abstract

A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2012. "Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency," THEMA Working Papers 2012-36, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-36
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2012-36.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dominique Lepelley, 1996. "Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 491-500.
    2. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 685-688, October.
    3. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    4. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    5. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2013. "The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules," Working Papers hal-00914907, HAL.
    2. Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2015. "The $$q$$ q -majority efficiency of positional rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 31-49, July.
    3. Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2015. "The q-majority efficiency of positional rules," Post-Print hal-00914907, HAL.
    4. Sébastien Courtin & Mathieu Martin & Issofa Moyouwou, 2013. "The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules," THEMA Working Papers 2013-29, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Positional rules (Simple and Sequential) . Condorcet Consistency . q-majority;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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