A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies
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More about this item
Keywords
strategic delegation; bargaining; product substitutability; price;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2012-12-15 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2012-12-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-COM-2012-12-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2012-12-15 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-GTH-2012-12-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2012-12-15 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-15 (Microeconomics)
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