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Has regulatory reform been misdirected?

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  • Goodhart, Charles

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a provocative and critical introduction and solutions to significant contemporary issues of financial regulation. Design/methodology/approach The paper is an expert’s review of contemporary issues and challenges in financial regulation. Findings The paper advocates that contemporary financial regulation challenges are addressed through governance reforms and an enhanced focus on maturity transformation, rather than a focus on just capital and liquidity management. In particular, more emphasis should be given to individual decision-makers within banks rather than institutions. Practical implications The review paper considers areas where future regulatory reform may be enhanced and redirected. Originality/value The review provides original and critical perspectives on contemporary regulatory challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, Charles, 2017. "Has regulatory reform been misdirected?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84239, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:84239
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84239/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Meinhard A. Jensen, 2015. "A Commentary on Patrizio Lainà's 'Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: A Historical Survey from David Ricardo to Martin Wolf'," Economic Thought, World Economics Association, vol. 4(2), pages 1-20, September.
    2. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226081946 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, 2015. "Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 3-29.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Yang & Ashton, John K. & Jaafar, Aziz, 2019. "Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5).
    2. John Ashton & Tim Burnett & Ivan Diaz Rainey & Peter L. Ormosi, 2018. "Has the financial regulatory environment improved in the UK? Capture-Recapture approach to estimate detection and deterrence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Xuefang Liu & W. Robert J. Alexander & Sajid Anwar, 2018. "Bank Runs in China: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Model," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 17(1), pages 15-30, June.
    4. Ashton, John & Burnett, Tim & Diaz-Rainey, Ivan & Ormosi, Peter, 2021. "Known unknowns: How much financial misconduct is detected and deterred?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    reform; regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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