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How China's growth model fosters green industrial dominance

Author

Listed:
  • Larsen, Mathias

Abstract

What explains China's global dominance of green industries? Here, I show that China's politics determine its growth model, and the growth model fosters clean tech development. First, China's authoritarian politics entail a growth-security trade-off, a preference for investment and exports, the elimination of powerful industrial coalitions, and a high degree of state capacity. Second, clean industries fit all of these four dimensions: 1) They reduce reliance on energy imports and allow China to keep green supply chains within its control. 2) They provide new drivers of investment and exports as real estate and low-skilled manufacturing lose their ability to drive growth. 3) No incumbent industrial coalition can resist their expansion, as the same stateowned companies often own both clean and dirty assets. 4) Finally, without electoral or legal constraints, the party-state supports them through supply-side, demand-side, and macro-structural policies. Consequently, China has achieved green growth by decoupling emissions from growth. However, emission-intensive industries also fit the growth model, meaning the shift to clean technologies is, so far, proportional rather than nominal. Further progress requires either political and economic reform, which is unlikely, or technological progress that lets clean technologies outcompete fossil alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Larsen, Mathias, 2026. "How China's growth model fosters green industrial dominance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 141319, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:141319
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/141319/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucio Baccaro & Jonas Pontusson, 2022. "The politics of growth models," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 204-221, January.
    2. Driscoll, Daniel & Kiefel, Max & Larsen, Mathias, 2026. "Internationalizing industrial policy: how China and the United States use state capacity to secure critical minerals for electric vehicles," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 137142, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Wu, Mingqin & Cao, Xun, 2021. "Greening the career incentive structure for local officials in China: Does less pollution increase the chances of promotion for Chinese local leaders?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Daniel Driscoll & Max Kiefel & Mathias Larsen, 2026. "Internationalizing Industrial Policy: How China and the United States Use State Capacity to Secure Critical Minerals for Electric Vehicles," Politics & Society, , vol. 54(2), pages 215-246, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

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