Electoral logics of trade coalitions

This article examines the evolution of trade coalitions in the United States and the role of issue linkage in shaping legislative support for trade liberalisation. Issue linkage – the strategy of incorporating additional policy areas such as labour and environmental standards into trade negotiations – has been widely viewed as a mechanism to broaden domestic coalitions for international agreements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) illustrates both the potential and limitations of this approach. NAFTA passed after the Clinton administration negotiated labour and environmental side agreements, despite strong opposition from major unions and environmental groups. Existing scholarship assumes that linking salient issues can sway interest groups and legislators; however, my research shows that electoral incentives critically moderate these effects. It suggests that issue linkage does not uniformly translate into legislative support; rather, its effectiveness depends on the electoral context and legislators’ strategic calculations. The article concludes by considering how rising polarisation may constrain issue linkage as a coalition-building tool.