Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data

I show that a credibility gap is created between the scientist and the government if the preference of the scientist is not perfectly aligned with that of the government. I find a remarkable result that the credibility gap is eliminated and the ex-ante social welfare is maximized if and only if the scientist’s preference is perfectly aligned with that of the government, not with that of the median voter. This is endogenously achieved when the government is allowed to appoint its optimal scientist without election concerns. In the case where the government has election concerns, if the median voter perceives an alarming message from the climate scientist, then even a “right-wing” government must choose an aggressive climate change policy to avoid losing the election. Accordingly, it will prefer to appoint a climate scientist who is unlikely to send an alarming message. Thus the government deliberately creates a credibility gap which may cause a distorted climate change policy in a democracy. Key Words: Climate Change; Cheap-Talk; Elections; SocialWelfare.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)