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The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies

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  • Heather Elko McKibben

Abstract

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states’ bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.

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  • Heather Elko McKibben, 2013. "The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(2), pages 411-427, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:57:y:2013:i:2:p:411-427
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00628.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Kirpsza, 2023. "Quid Pro Quo. The Effect of Issue Linkage on Member States' Bargaining Success in European Union Lawmaking," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 323-343, March.
    2. Benjamin Martill & Uta Staiger, 2021. "Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 261-277, March.
    3. Marianna Lovato, 2022. "Getting your House in Order for EU Negotiations: When Domestic Constraints Condition Italy's Performance at the EU Level," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 963-982, July.

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