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La venganza de los no comerciables: Competencia doméstica en México desde la adopción del TLCAN

Author

Listed:
  • García Alba, Pascual

    (Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México)

Abstract

La experiencia mexicana es prueba irrefutable de que la apertura comercial no es suficiente para superar los problemas de una economía. Hay tareas igualmente importantes que deben ser acometidas al mismo tiempo. Estas pasan por la apertura al sector privado de actividades reservadas al Estado. Pero esa apertura debe ser acompañada de acciones complementarias. La etapa fácil de las reformas es la privatización, luego viene lo difícil: asegurar la competencia y el acceso abierto a esas actividades, en casos de monopolio natural, de externalidades, de economías de red; y que si se dejan sin atender, terminarán por propiciar abusos de poder de mercado, estancamiento (los monopolios frenan la producción para aumentar precios), y mermas en la distribución del ingreso (pues si los monopolios públicos simplemente se convierten en monopolios privados, muchos tendrán que pagar precios excesivos, en beneficio de unos cuantos).

Suggested Citation

  • García Alba, Pascual, 2006. "La venganza de los no comerciables: Competencia doméstica en México desde la adopción del TLCAN," EGAP Working Papers 2006-12, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México.
    • Handle: RePEc:ega:docume:200612
    as

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    File URL: http://alejandria.ccm.itesm.mx/egap/documentos/EGAP-2006-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crecimiento económico; competencia económica; México; monopolios; TLCAN;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • C50 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - General

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