Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment
Game theory was used to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around the Southern Sonkhla Lake in Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of non-cooperative game theory for investigating fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and with individual quotas (IQ), and co-management with ITQs and with IQ. The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under high and low fish stocks that arose due to seasonal salinity in the Lake. Higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction and ensuring resource sustainability. There were no significant differences between ‘with ITQ’ and ‘without ITQ’ in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors when ITQs were used rather than with IQ. The ITQs provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, implementation of ITQ is recommended but with appropriate penalties.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2013|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.eepsea.net|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2004.
"Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems,"
Forest Policy and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 6(3-4), pages 229-241, June.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2004. "Norms from outside and from inside: An experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems," Artefactual Field Experiments 00025, The Field Experiments Website.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, .
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
IEW - Working Papers
010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Nielsen, Jesper Raakjær & Degnbol, Poul & Viswanathan, K. Kuperan & Ahmed, Mahfuzuddin & Hara, Mafaniso & Abdullah, Nik Mustapha Raja, 2004. "Fisheries co-management--an institutional innovation? Lessons from South East Asia and Southern Africa," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-160, March.
- Elinor Ostrom & Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2004.
"What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00027, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 307-326, December.
- Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "What do people bring into the game: experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," CAPRi working papers 32, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2003. "Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 263-289, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Arief Anshory yusuf)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.