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Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong

    () (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Pathomwat Chantarasap

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Wittawat Hemtanon

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

  • Papitchaya Saelim

    (Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla)

Abstract

Game theory was used to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around the Southern Sonkhla Lake in Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of non-cooperative game theory for investigating fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and with individual quotas (IQ), and co-management with ITQs and with IQ. The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under high and low fish stocks that arose due to seasonal salinity in the Lake. Higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction and ensuring resource sustainability. There were no significant differences between ‘with ITQ’ and ‘without ITQ’ in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors when ITQs were used rather than with IQ. The ITQs provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, implementation of ITQ is recommended but with appropriate penalties.

Suggested Citation

  • Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong & Pathomwat Chantarasap & Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul & Wittawat Hemtanon & Papitchaya Saelim, 2013. "Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment," EEPSEA Research Report rr2013021, Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), revised Feb 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021
    as

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    File URL: http://www.eepsea.org/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2004. "Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3-4), pages 229-241, June.
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    3. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    4. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 307-326, December.
    5. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2003. "Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 263-289, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

    game theory; Thailand;

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