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Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical Survey

Author

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  • Peter J. Wood

    () (Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University)

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, and games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is also examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Wood, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical Survey," CCEP Working Papers 0210, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  • Handle: RePEc:een:ccepwp:0210
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    File URL: http://ccep.anu.edu.au/data/2010/pdf/wpaper/CCEP-2-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2008. "How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games," MPRA Paper 12751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin," Working Papers 2008-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mei├čner, Nathalie, 2013. "The incentives of private companies to invest in protected area certificates: How coalitions can improve ecosystem sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 148-158.
    2. repec:eee:apmaco:v:265:y:2015:i:c:p:187-195 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kennedy, Matthew & Basu, Biswajit, 2014. "An analysis of the climate change architecture," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 185-193.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; negotiations; game theory; implementation theory;

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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