Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical Survey
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, and games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is also examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +61 2 6125 4705
Fax: +61 2 6125 5448
Web page: http://ccep.anu.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2008. "How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games," MPRA Paper 12751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin,"
2008-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin," Working Papers 2008-11, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:een:ccepwp:0210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Stern)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.