Self Governance in Social Networks of Information Transmission
This paper studies the problem of self governance in a model in which information flows are governed by the community structure. In each round of an infinitely repeated game, an agent and an investor, who is selected from a finite set of investors, play a trust game. Investors receive information only from their own social contacts and may act upon after receiving news about opportunistic behavior. We explore the social networks leading to self governance and emphasize how the architecture of such networks is shaped by the technology with which surplus can be created in each round. We formally show how the details of the transactions determine the density and cohesiveness of the social network. An application to the interaction between formal and informal institutions of exchange is provided, and it is shown that markets may harm networked relationships by deteriorating the monitoring quality.JEL classification numbers: D85, C73, L14, D82.
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- Bernardo Lara & Alejandra Mizala & Andrea Repetto, 2009.
"The Effectiveness of Private Voucher Education: Evidence from Structural School Switches,"
Documentos de Trabajo
263, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Andrea Repetto & Alejandra Mizala & Bernardo Lara, 2010. "The Effectiveness of Private Voucher Education: Evidence from Structural School Switches," 2010 Meeting Papers 104, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Francisco Henríquez & Alejandra Mizala & Andrea Repetto, 2009. "Effective Schools for Low Income Children: a Study of Chile’s Sociedad de Instrucción Primaria," Documentos de Trabajo 258, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Sebastian Gallegos, 2010. "Public-Private Wage Gap In Latin America (1999-2007): A Matching Approach," Documentos de Trabajo 268, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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