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Efficient Pareto-improving Processes

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  • Kwan Koo Yun

Abstract

We give two procedures for determining whether efficient Pareto improving local changes are possible. When they are, the procedures compute for them. Any procedure generating efficient and Pareto improving changes can be replicated by these procedures. The two programs form a striking duality. We apply the procedures to Pareto improving exchange processes, Pareto-improving tariff-tax reforms and to the problem of constrained Pareto optimum where informational constraints are present.

Suggested Citation

  • Kwan Koo Yun, 2004. "Efficient Pareto-improving Processes," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 784, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:784
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    File URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.863.1082215000.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto improvement; constrained Pareto optimum;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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