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Bank Sovereign Bond Holdings, Sovereign Shock Spillovers, and Moral Hazard durning the European Crisis

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  • Beltratti, Andrea

    (Bocconi University)

  • Stulz, Rene M.

    (OH State University and ECGI, Brussels)

Abstract

From 2010 to 2012, the relation between bank stock returns from European Union (EU) countries and the returns on sovereign CDS of peripheral (GIIPS) countries is negative. We use days with tail sovereign CDS returns of peripheral countries to identify the effects of shocks to the cost of borrowing of these countries on EU banks from other countries. A CDS tail return affects banks with greater exposure to the country experiencing that return more, but it has an impact on banks regardless of exposure. Shocks to peripheral countries that are more pervasive impact the returns of banks from countries that experience no shock more than shocks to small individual peripheral countries. In general, the impact of tail returns is asymmetric in that banks suffer less from adverse shocks to peripheral countries than they gain from favourable shocks to such countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Beltratti, Andrea & Stulz, Rene M., 2015. "Bank Sovereign Bond Holdings, Sovereign Shock Spillovers, and Moral Hazard durning the European Crisis," Working Paper Series 2015-06, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2015-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schnabel, Isabel & Schüwer, Ulrich, 2016. "What drives the relationship between bank and sovereign credit risk?," Working Papers 07/2016, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    2. Susanna Saroyan & Lilit Popoyan, 2017. "Bank-sovereign ties against interbank market integration: the case of the Italian segment," LEM Papers Series 2017/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Beltratti, Andrea & Paladino, Giovanna, 2016. "Basel II and regulatory arbitrage. Evidence from financial crises," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 180-196.
    4. Cabrera, Matias & Dwyer, Gerald P. & Samartín-Saénz, Margarita, 2016. "Government finances and bank bailouts: Evidence from European stock markets," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 169-179.
    5. Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry & Ioannidou, Vasso, 2015. "Determinants and Valuation Effects of the Home Bias in European Banks' Sovereign Debt Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 10661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Marta Gómez-Puig & Simón Sosvilla-Rivero & Manish K. Singh, 2018. "“The robustness of the sovereign-bank interconnection: Evidence from contingent claims analysis”," IREA Working Papers 201804, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Feb 2018.
    7. Schnabel, Isabel & Schüwer, Ulrich, 2017. "What Drives the Sovereign-Bank Nexus?," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168259, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Kirschenmann, Karolin & Korte, Josef & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "The zero risk fallacy? Banks' sovereign exposure and sovereign risk spillovers," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-069, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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